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IN THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS
STATE OF UTAH,
Plaintiff/Appellee,
v.

Case No. 20010462-CA

KELLY LAFE GARNER,

Priority No. 2

Defendant/Appellant
BRIEF OF APPELLEE
JURISDICTION AND NATURE OF PROCEEDINGS
This is an appeal from a conviction for four counts of
burglary, all third degree felonies (R. 94-95).

This Court has

jurisdiction over the appeal pursuant to Utah Code Ann. § 78-2a3(2)(f)(Supp. 2001)
STATEMENT OF THE ISSUE ON APPEAL AND
STANDARD OF APPELLATE REVIEW
If this Court chooses to consider the merits of defendant's
inadequately articulated and briefed claim, the issue is:
Did the trial court properly deny defendant's motion to
dismiss on the ground that his constitutional right to a speedy
trial was not violated by the passage of 14 months between the
State's filing of an information against defendant and its
subsequent filing of a detainer?
x%x

[T] he propriety of a trial court's decision to grant or

1

deny a motion to dismiss is a question of law that we review for
correctness.'"

State v. Amoroso, 1999 UT App 60, |6, 975 P.2d

505 (quoting Tiede v. State, 915 P.2d 500, 502 (Utah
1996)) (alteration in original) .
CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISIONS, STATUTES AND RULES
The Sixth Amendment to the United States Constitution
provides: "In all criminal prosecutions, the accused shall enjoy
the right to a speedy and public trial.

..."

STATEMENT OF THE CASE
The chronology of events pertinent to this appeal is as
follows:
Nov. 1997 - March 1998

Offenses at issue are committed (R.
1-10; R. 106 at addendum A)

May 1998

State's witness makes written
statement implicating defendant (R.
106); defendant, incarcerated in
Davis County, agrees to talk to
investigators upon release from
jail, but instead flees the
jurisdiction (R. 107)

June 1998-August 1999

Defendant incarcerated in Colorado
(R. 107)

May 1999

Defendant's mother dies (R. 107; R.
113, tab 4, p. 12)

June 14, 1999

Information filed (R. 1-10)

November 1999

Defendant transported to Alabama
State Prison for parole violation
(R. 107-08)

Mid-July - Aug. 3, 2000

Utah lodges detainer (R. 108)

January 4, 2001

Arraignment; Defendant waives
2

preliminary hearing and enters plea
of not guilty (R. 36-40)
January 29, 2001

Motion to Suppress/Dismiss filed;
defendant raises speedy trial issue
(R. 48-52)

February 22, 2 001

Motion hearing; defendant argues
his due process rights violated by
pre-filing delay; his speedy trial
right denied by delay between
filing of information and placing
of detainer (R. 113, tab 4, pp. 14) .

March 22, 2001

Motion to Dismiss denied (R. 73-74)

April 19, 2001

Defendant enters guilty plea to
four counts of burglary, reserving
right to appeal speedy trial issue
(R. 91-92; R. 113, tab 7, p. 2-3)

May 14, 2001

Minute Order: Judgment, Sentence,
Commitment to Utah State Prison, 05 years, concurrent with an Alabama
sentence currently being served;
$10,840 in restitution, collectable
after completion of Alabama
parole/probation (R. 94-96)

May 31, 2001

Notice of appeal filed (R. 101)

July 11, 2001

Findings of Fact, Conclusions of
Law, and Order denying Motion to
Dismiss (R. 106-09 or addendum A)
STATEMENT OF THE FACTS

The facts of the offense of burglary are not pertinent to
the resolution of this case,
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT
At the outset, this Court may choose not to consider
defendant's claim because it is both inadequately presented and

3

argued.

Even on the merits, however, defendant's constitutional

right to a speedy trial, when evaluated pursuant to the fourprong balancing test articulated in Barker v. Wingo, 407 U.S. 514
(1972), was not violated by the passage of 14 months between the
filing of the information and the lodging of the detainer.
Although the length of the delay triggers further analysis, the
delay was not intentional on the State's part, defendant did not
assert his right until nearly five months after the detainer had
been lodged and, most importantly, defendant has wholly failed to
establish any prejudice arising from the delay.

Consequently,

his claim fails.
ARGUMENT
DEFENDANT HAS NOT ADEQUATELY
ARTICULATED OR BRIEFED HIS SPEEDY
TRIAL CLAIM; IN ANY EVENT, SUCH AN
ARGUMENT WOULD FAIL UNDER THE FOURPART BALANCING TEST ARTICULATED IN
BARKER V. WINGO, 407 U.S. 514
(1972)
In the trial court, defendant moved for dismissal, arguing
that the State's delay in filing charges against him violated his
right.to due process and that the passage of time between the
State's filing of the information and its placement of the
detainer violated his right to a speedy trial (R. 113, tab 4, pp.
2-4).

The trial court rejected these claims, focusing its

written ruling largely on the speedy trial issue (R. 106-09 at
addendum A ) .

4

On appeal, defendant's argument is unclear.

Nowhere does he

articulate the distinction he asserted in the trial court between
pre-filing delay as a due process violation and post-filing delay
as a speedy trial violation.

To the contrary, he seems to merge

the due process and speedy trial arguments, focusing primarily on
the pre-filing delay and secondarily on the post-filing delay,
but framing both in the rubric of speedy trial violations.
See Br. of App. at 13-14.
In addition to the lack of clarity in articulating the
parameters of his argument, defendant's legal analysis is
inadequate.

While he discusses a United States Supreme Court

case at some length and cites to several Utah cases, his brief
contains but a single page of argumentation, which does little to
clarify how the law applies to the facts of his case.

See Br. of

App. at 13.
Under such circumstances, this Court should decline to even
consider his claim.

Pursuant to rule 24(a)(9), Utah Rules of

Appellate Procedure, a reviewing court is "entitled to have the
issues clearly defined with pertinent authority cited," and is
not "simply a depository in which the appealing party may dump
the burden of argument and research."
1017, 1024 (Utah 1996).

Monson v. Carver, 928 P.2d

This Court has consistently declined to

address issues not adequately briefed under rule 24.

See, e.g.,

State v. Yates, 834 P.2d 599, 602 (Utah App. 1992); State v.

5

Price, 827 P.2d 247, 249 (Utah App. 1992); State v. Day, 815 P.2d
1345, 1351 (Utah App. 1991) .
Even if this Court were to address defendant's claims, they
would fail.
Defendant first argues that the delay of 13 months between
the time the State obtained a witness statement implicating him
in the crimes at issue and the time the State filed the
information violated his speedy trial right (Br. of App. at 13) *
This claim fails at the outset because until a defendant has been
formally accused, either by the filing of an information or an
indictment, the right to a speedy trial is not implicated.1
Doggett v. United States, 505 U.S. 647, 651-52 (1992)(identifying
"the interval between accusation and trial" as the critical
period in which delay may trigger a speedy trial analysis).
Defendant also argues that the delay between the State's
filing of the information and its filing of a detainer some 13 to
14 months later violated his right to a speedy trial (Br. of App.
at 13). This delay triggers the analysis set forth in Barker v.
1

Even if this claim had been argued on appeal as a due
process violation, it would necessarily fail. The trial court
found that investigators had sought to interview defendant in
jail prior to charging him in this case (R. 107). Defendant
agreed to be interviewed upon his release from jail but then
immediately absconded from the jurisdiction (Id.). Having thus
impeded the investigation, defendant cannot now claim that the
length of delay caused by his own conduct violated his right to
due process. See State v. Trafny, 799 P.2d 704, 707 (Utah 1990)
(delay attributable to defendant, should not be assessed against
the State).
6

Winao, 407 U.S. 514, 530 (1972) and endorsed in Utah by State v.
Banks, 720 P.2d 1380, 1385 (Utah 1986).

Pursuant to that

analysis, a reviewing court balances the impact of four factors,
the first of which is the length of the delay.

Barker, 407 U.S.

at 530; Banks, 720 P.2d at 1385. Generally, postaccusation delay
of about a year, as in this case, will trigger further judicial
review.

Doggett, 505 U.S. at 652 n.l (citing 2 W. LaFave & J.

Israel, Criminal Procedure § 18.2, p.1 405 (1984)).

Certainly,

when delay stretches beyond what is ordinary in the course of
judicial proceedings, its prejudicial effect will intensify over
time.

Doggett, 505 U.S. at 652,

In this case, the delay of just

over a year, while not ordinary, was not extraordinary.
The second factor examined by a reviewing court is the
reason for the delay.

Barker, 407 U.S. at 531. Barker teaches

that "different weights should be assigned to different reasons,"
with intentional delays held against the State.

Id. Negligence,

on the other hand, is *[a] more neutral reason" and "should be
weighted less heavily."

Id.

In this case, the State conceded at

trial that the delay between June of 1999, when the information
was filed, and August of 2000, when the detainer was lodged "is
simply negligence, dereliction, whatever. I don't have an
explanation" (R. 113, tab 4, p. 9).
Third, a reviewing court looks at whether and how a
defendant asserts his right to a speedy trial.

7

Barker, 407 U.S.

at 531.

In this case, defendant waited almost six months after

Utah lodged its detainer in Alabama before he filed his motion to
dismiss asserting his right to a speedy trial (R. 48-52) .
The fourth factor is prejudice to defendant resulting from
the delay.

Barker, 407 U.S. at 532. Defendant contends that he

was actually prejudiced by the delay between the time Utah filed
charges against him and the time it filed a detainer, pointing
specifically to Alabama's refusal to consider him for parole once
it realized that Utah had an interest in him (Br. of App. at
13) .2

This claim fails because no record evidence supports this

factual allegation.3

2

Under the rubric of speedy trial, defendant also argues
that his mother would have provided an alibi for him and that,
consequently, he was actually prejudiced by her death during the
pre-filing delay. See Br. of App. at 13. In the trial court,
however, defendant's counsel stated, "I'm agreeing that the death
of the mother does not affect the speedy trial argument. That
was the due process argument. A speedy trial because, the right
to a speedy trial does not apply to the information as filed so
any prejudice that occurred prior to that time would not, would
clearly not affect to whether or not the defendant was denied his
right to a speedy trial [sic]. I'm agreeing with [the
prosecutor] that the death of the mother does not apply to that
argument" (R. 113, tab 4, p.18). Defendant plainly cannot argue
on appeal precisely what he conceded below - that his mother's
death, which occurred prior to the time he was charged, had any
effect on a right that accrued only after he had been formally
charged. State v. Tueller, 2001 UT App 317, 1(21, 37 P.3d 1180.
3

Defendant argued in the trial court that he need not
prove "actual prejudice" because a delay of more than 12 months
created "presumptive prejudice." See R. 113, tab 4, pp. 4-5, 1215. On appeal, however, defendant has seemingly abandoned the
presumptive prejudice argument, and focused wholly on what he
perceives to be actual prejudice. See Br. of App. at 13-14.
8

In the trial court, defense counsel asserted that the State
stipulated that defendant had suffered the "loss of parole date"
based on the State's delay in filing a detainer (R. 113, tab 5,
p. 3-4). The State responded, "I have not stipulated to that but
I didn't have any reason to dispute that. . . . I don't have any
reason to know otherwise, your Honor, that could very well be"
(Id. at 4).

In essence, the State simply said that it didn't

have knowledge on the matter one way or the other.

The trial

court then directed counsel, " [Prosecutor,] you'll prepare the
findings of fact and if you'll look at those, [defense counsel],
and make sure that you have any facts that you want listed in
that finding of facts so that's preserved" (Id.).

Notably, the

findings of fact before this Court on appeal are wholly silent on
the issue of a parole date, whether defendant had one, or if it
was denied.

Without any record evidence, this Court cannot

conclude that defendant suffered prejudice by failing to obtain
parole in Alabama as a result of a delay between the filing of
the information and the lodging of a detainer.
Wulffenstein, 657 P.2d 289, 293 (Utah 1982).

9

State v.

CONCLUSION
For the reasons stated, this Court should affirm defendant's
four convictions for burglary, a third degree felony.
RESPECTFULLY submitted this T

day of March, 2002.
MARK L. SHURTLEFF
Attorney General

JOANNE C; SLOTNIK
Assistant Attorney General

CERTIFICATE OF MAILING
I hereby certify that two true and accurate copies of the
foregoing brief of appellee were mailed first-class, postage
prepaid, to Maurice Richards, attorney for appellant, Public
Defenders Association of Weber County, 2568 Washington Blvd.,
Suite 102, Ogden, Utah 84401, this _7__ day of March, 2002.
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ADDENDUM A

RICHARD A. PARMLEY LBN 2528
WEBER COUNTY ATTORNEYS OFFICE
2380 WASHINGTON BLVD., 2ND FLOOR
OGDEN, UTAH 84401
TELEPHONE: (801) 399-8377

IN THE SECOND DISTRICT COURT OF WEBER COUNTY,
STATE OF UTAH

STATE OF UTAH,
Plaintiff,

FINDINGS OF FACT,
CONCLUSIONS OF LAW. AND
ORDER OF THE COURT

vs.
Case No 991902255
KELLY L. GARNER
Defendant.

Judge Parley R Baldwin

This matter came before the Court for hearing on the Defendant's motion to dismiss for
denial of speedy trial and claimed violation of due process of law The Defendant was present and
represented by Martin Gravis. The State was represented by Richard Parmley. The Court heard
the arguments and took the matter under advisement until March 22, 2001, at which time the
Court made an order from the bench denying the Defendant's motion to dismiss The Court
issues these written findings of fact, conclusions of law and order consistent with that action
FINDINGS OF FACT
1.

The offenses with which the Defendant was charged occurred between November
1997 and March 1998

2.

A key witness for the State made a written statement in May of 1998 identifying
the Defendant as the perpetrator of the crimes This statement was further
developed over a period of four to six months

3

Defendant had been arrested in Davis County and was in the Davis County Jail
from April of 1998 to May of 1998

4

The Defendant knew of the investigation being conducted in Wreber County and
had indicated a willingness to talk with investigators there upon his release from
the Davis County Jail.

5

Weber County investigators wanted to interview the suspect before a decision was
made to charge him.

6

When the Defendant was released from the jail he fled the jurisdiction while the
Davis County matters remained unadjudicated.

7.

The Defendant never made contact with the Weber County investigators who were
continuing to investigate the case through the remainder of 1998 and beginning of
1999.

8.

In May of 1999, the Defendant's mother died and Defendant claims she would
have offered pertinent alibi testimony in his defense.

9.

The Defendant was arrested for criminal trespass in Colorado in June of 1998 and
remained incarcerated there until August of 1999

10.

The County Attorney's Office filed this case in June of 1999, approximately one
year after Weber County had begun investigation.

11.

At the time the informations were filed, Weber County investigators had learned of
the Defendant's incarceration in Colorado

12.

Weber County did not locate the Defendant's exact whereabouts in Colorado to
lodge a detainer at that time.

13

In November of 1999, the Defendant was transported to the .Alabama State Prison

for a parole violation.
14.

The Defendant remained in the .Alabama prison until shonly after the State became
aware of his whereabouts and lodged a detainer sometime between mid July and
August 3, 2000.
CONCLUSIONS OF LAW

1.

The delay between the commission of the offenses and the filing of the charge in
this case were not intentional on the part of the State to gain strategic advantage

2.

There were various reasonable explanations for the delay including a desire to talk
with the defendant who had fled the jurisdiction and other efforts to bolster the
evidence against the Defendant by obtaining statements from other witnesses

3.

The delay of one year between charging the Defendant and bringing him to trial is
not alone sufficient to conclude a denial of a right to speedy trial but warrants
consideration of the other factors set forth in Barker v. Wineo. 407 U.S. 514
(1972) and State v Banks. 720 P 2d 1380 (Utah 1986) (reason for the delay.
Defendant's assertion of his right, and prejudice to the Defendant)

4.

In balancing these factors and the other circumstances contained in the findings of
fact the Defendant has not been denied his right to a speedy trial
ORDER

The Court denies the Defendant's motion to dismiss
DATED this

'

day orameUOQ 1

-,'vU.UM.'
}

arley R. Baldwin
District Court Judge
•

j

^

^Prxpiaieci by

^

RJchard A. Parmley

Approved as to form:

V Gravis

CERTIFICATE OF DELIVERY
This is to certify that a true and correct copy of the foregoing FINDINGS OF FACT
CONCLUSIONS OF LAW ANT) ORDER OF THE COL'RT was hand delivered or mailed,
postage pre-paid, to:
Martin V Gravis
Public Defender's Association, Inc ,
Attorney for Defendant
2568 Washington Blvd., Suite 203
Ogden, Utah 84401

DATED this / A ^ d a y of June, 2001
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